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Abstract 
Between 1933 and 1945, the German film industry was transformed from a group 
of independent movie studios into a branch of the Nazi government. As part of the 
Ministry for Popular Enlightenment and Propaganda, headed by Dr Joseph Goebbels, the 
German cinema became an integral part of the Nazi effort to ideologically indoctrinate 
the population of Germany. However, the industry continued to operate in the same 
commercial manner as it had previously, producing films intended to appeal to paying 
German audiences. Because the cinema continued to function as a popular consumer 
marketplace, the varying film tastes of German filmgoers continued to influence the types 
of films produced even as Goebbels labored to transform the German cinema into an 
ideological weapon. Thus film production under Nazi Germany was not only the product 
of Goebbels ideological goals, but also public taste. 
This paper traces the Nazi’s efforts to control the film industry, in the process 
examining a number of films that illustrate both Goebbel’s changing propaganda goals 
and the German public’s shifting taste in films during the Nazi regime. Box office 
records from the years leading up to and following the outbreak of World War II provide 
new insight into German consumption of films and serve to illustrate the high degree to 
which the German public supported the war. 
In context, the popularity of specific films and types of films over time reveals not 
only how Goebbels’ adapted his propaganda to the changing circumstances, but also how 
the filmgoing German public reacted to those same events as a group and the change in 
those responses over time. 
 
 
  3 
Popular Ideology: 
The Cinema of Nazi Germany 
 
When Hitler and the National Socialist German Workers Party 
(Nationalsozialistsche Deutsche Arbetierpartei or NSDAP) came to power in 1933, 
Germany had the second largest and most popular film industry in the world.1 Over the 
course of the Third Reich from 1933 to 1945, film was transformed form a largely 
unrestricted medium of artistic expression of the Weimar period of 1918-1933, into a 
tightly controlled means for the state to influence the very thoughts and emotions of 
German film goers. This systematic manipulation of the medium to rigidly enforce 
ideology stands largely without precedent in the history of the cinema. 
 Between 1934 and 1942, the German film industry underwent a series of radical 
reorganizations, as Dr Joseph Goebbels, Minister of Propaganda, set about bringing all 
the major German film studios under his personal control. His aim was to use the cinema 
as an instrument of Nazi ideology. However in the process of bringing the industry under 
his control, he had to reckon with the tastes of the German filmgoer. Germans had very 
cosmopolitan tastes in films, characterized by interest in genres ranging from comedies 
and love stories to dramas, historical films and adventure stories. In order to ensure the 
best possible reception for his ideological content, Goebbels had to be particular about 
the manner in which a motion picture incorporated propaganda. As such, he employed 
films that subtly displayed and encouraged National Socialist tendencies independently of 
the film’s content. As Germany’s circumstances changed over the course of the Nazi 
                                                
1 Kristin Thompson, Herr Lubitsch goes to Hollywood: German and American film after 
World War I, (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2005), 18. 
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regime, Goebbels propaganda themes changed in response to broader events. At the same 
time, the popular reception of these themes forced Goebbels to re-evaluate his 
propaganda in order to improve the ideological impact.  
The cinema of Nazi Germany occupies a peculiar place in history. Historians tend 
to frame it in terms of opposites, on the one handing arguing it could represent the 
wholesale abuse of film as a medium, subverting the power of the motion picture to an 
evil ideology for purposes of world domination and global destruction.2 On the other, 
these films can be considered prime examples of the beauty and power of cinema to 
inspire the viewer and instill emotions.3 What these historians of the Third Reich tend to 
fail at is separating out the agenda from the mechanisms and practices. Because of the 
nature and associations of this subject, I feel it necessary to establish from the onset, that 
the Nazis were responsible for human suffering on a massive scale seldom seen, such that 
their name is synonymous with any institutionalized practices of murder, violence and 
repression. There is no way around that. One could go so far as to say there are no 
acceptable avenues for the historian to rationalize their actions. From that perspective, it 
is relatively easy to condemn their cinema, and indeed any cultural undertakings from the 
period, as products of an inherently evil system without any merits. It would follow that 
there is no further purpose in studying them. It should be fairly obvious this not the case. 
Many of the films produced in Nazi Germany are counted among the greatest cinematic 
triumphs.  
                                                
2 Eric Rentschler, The Ministry of Illusion: Nazi Cinema and it’s Afterlife. (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1996), 8. 
3 Ibid, 9. 
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Today, popular sentiments regarding the Nazi regime tend to represent the period 
in terms of contemporary notions of evil, as a repressive state that abused its citizens. 
This representation of National Socialism is embodied in the film perhaps most often 
identified with the period, Leni Riefenstahl’s Triumph des Willens (Triumph of the 
Will.)4  The film presents scenes of mass spectacle, disciplined obedience to authority, 
rigid conformity, and a god-line cult of leadership in what is widely recognized as one of 
the greatest works of propaganda ever made. Studies on the cinema of Third Reich during 
the last twenty years have been largely critical of Leni Riefenstahl’s impact on Nazi 
cinema. Despite her role as a prominent actress and Adolph Hitler’s favorite director, her 
influence on contemporary images of Nazism seems to have been much more pronounced 
than her contribution to the larger body of films made under the Third Reich. The most 
important personality in Nazi cinema, rather, was Joseph Goebbels, whose role as the 
Minster of Propaganda afforded him complete control of the film industry and its output. 
While he was responsible for producing cinematic propaganda, as his title suggests, 
ideological films made specifically at his request account for only a small portion of the 
total output of feature films made during the Nazi regime.5 In recent years, a number of 
studies have challenged the degree to which Goebbels actually exerted control over film 
production, and the notion that the entire film industry was subverted into a platform for 
National Socialist ideology. 
                                                
4Susan Tegel, Nazis and the Cinema, (London, Continuum Books, 2007), 6. 
5 This tendency may date back to the 1940s, when the United States released the 
propaganda series Why We Fight. Directed by Frank Capra, it presented Americans with 
images of the Nazis taken directly from Triumph of the Will to illustrate the Nazi war 
effort. Ian S. Scott, “Why We Fight and Projections of America: Frank Capra, Robert 
Riskin and the Making of WWII Propaganda” in Why We Fought: America’s Wars in 
Film and History, (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 2008), 249. 
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Interest in the cinema of the Third Reich has become increasingly popular since 
the reunification of Germany and the opening of the East German archives in 1990, 
releasing a wealth of previously unknown documents regarding the film industry. 
Numerous studies have revealed a murky and disparate picture of the German film 
industry under Nazi Germany. For all the contradictory conclusions about the state of 
film production under the Nazis, the majority of these studies consistently establish the 
same events and themes. 
For this paper, the most important study conducted on the cinema of Nazi 
Germany is Propaganda and the German Cinema, 1933-1945 by David Welch. His book 
attempts “to trace various components of the ideology which recur in the cinema of the 
Third Reich, in order to discover what this reveals about the nature of propaganda in 
general and the ideology of National Socialism in particular.”6 While he is examining 
propaganda as it relates to Nazism, a fundamentally different issue, his research and 
interpretations underlie a significant portion of this thesis. I tend to disagree with some of 
his conclusions, specifically regarding Goebbels’ intentions regarding certain films, and 
his tendency to pass judgment in the course of his analysis. However, the scope of his 
work is largely congruent with my own, and I make frequent references to his argument 
and research. 
Other studies have been highly informed by critical film. Some of these focus on 
specific cross-sections of films, such as the Ministry of Illusion: Nazi Cinema and its 
Afterlife by Eric Rentschler. A film historian, he focuses on feature film (Spielfilme) 
                                                
6 David Welch, Propaganda and the German Cinema,1933-1945, (London: I.B. Taurus), 
1. 
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production with the goal of highlighting the connections between politics and 
entertainment. However, despite his revisionist approach, the author bluntly states: 
“The Cinema of the Third Reich is to be seen in the context of a 
totalitarian state’s concerted attempt to create a culture industry in the 
service of mass deception. The Ministry of Propaganda endeavored to… 
remake German Film culture in the service of remaking German culture 
and the nation’s political body.”7  
 
He seems to suggest that the only way to look at German cinema of this period is as 
deliberate attempts at reeducating the masses with Nazi ideology. Despite an approach 
newly informed by film theorists and the study of individual films, the book is still 
hogtied by its understanding of the German film industry as a static, monolithic 
appendage of the Ministry of Propaganda. However, he does go on to qualify this by 
saying 
 
“When critics decry Nazi cinema as an abomination, they protest too 
much…It is common to reduce all Nazi films to hate pamphlets, party 
hagiography, or mindless escapism, films with too much substance or 
none at all, either execrable or frivolous. In the process, the reliance of the 
era’s cinema on classic Hollywood conventions goes unnoticed, as does 
the recourse of so many productions and so much of Nazi film culture to 
American techniques and popular genres.”8 
 
Rentschler asserts that certain elements of the totalitarian model are still relevant. 
On the one hand he argues that in context, the cinema of the Third Reich was largely 
produced with the explicit design of distracting its audience from the regime’s brutal 
tendencies, but on the other that the films produced under Nazi Germany are fairly 
typical of world cinema of the period. It may simply be that he is trying to avoid being 
                                                
7 Rentschler, The Ministry of Illusion, 16. 
8 Ibid, 22. 
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accused of holding Nazi sympathies. However it seems odd for him to address this by 
making it central to his argument. 
Studies comparing Nazi cinema with other contemporary world cinemas, 
primarily Hollywood, are common among the recent work done in this field. Among 
these, Sabine Hake’s book, Popular Cinema of the Third Reich, aims to treat the history 
of Third Reich cinema no differently than other periods of German film history. She 
argues that Third Reich cinema was primarily a popular cinema, sustained by “well-
established generic conventions, cultural traditions, aesthetic sensibilities, social 
practices, and a highly-developed star system,”9 and that it was too contradictory to be 
“dismissed as escapist entertainment or vilified as mass manipulation.”10 She suggests a 
great deal of continuity existed in the film industry before and after the establishment of 
National Socialist control, both in the way the film industry functioned and the films in it 
produced. In light of the drastic changes in organization and personnel wrought by the 
Nazis, most notably in the expelling of all Jews and leftists from the industry, it is hard to 
concur with a conclusion that so totally normalizes Nazi cinema. 
A study by Jana Bruns examines the lives of three of Nazi cinema’s three greatest 
female stars, Marika Rökk, Zarah Leander and Kristina Söderbaum.11 Her work 
represents a significant break with the view of the Third Reich’s cinema as a mouthpiece 
for disseminating propaganda. She argues that the relationship between the state and the 
film industry was far more “ambivalent”, and “failed to disseminate a coherent political 
                                                
9 Sabine Hake Popular Cinema of the Third Recih (Austin: University of Texas Press, 
2001), viii 
10 Ibid, xi 
11  Jana F. Bruns, Nazi Cinema's New Women (New York: Cambridge University Press 
2009), 9. 
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message.”12 “Audiences watched films whose visual and narrative organization was 
confusing and inconsistent, while other releases copied Hollywood and seemed utterly 
irrelevant to National Socialism.”13  Using these three actresses, she explores the role of 
women and the erotic in Third Reich cinema while employing a psychological model of 
split memory to explain the split memory many Germans had of the Nazi period. 
Another study, written by Mari-Elizabeth O’Brien entitled Nazi Cinema as Enchantment: 
The Politics of Entertainment in the Third Reich (2004), also suggests the amount of 
control the state exerted over cinema was far less than Göbbels would have liked or 
historians have been lead to believe. While examining five major genres, she argues that 
while the content of a film could be controlled in production, once released to theaters the 
government could not control the public reaction. 
Most of these studies have focused on various elements within either the film 
industry or the Ministry of Propaganda. Despite the amount of work in the field, very 
little work has been done concerning popular responses to the Nazified cinema. Just like 
in the United States, German cinema served to both inform and entertain the public. After 
the Nazi Party nationalized the Germany film industry in 1934, every film released by 
UFA (Universium Film AG, Germany’s largest pre-war studio) or other German studios 
served as a latent propaganda vehicle. While the most well known films of the period are 
explicit propaganda pieces, the best example being Leni Riefenstahl’s Triumph des 
Willens (Triumph of the Will), the vast majority of films produced in Nazi Germany were 
popular entertainment. From 1933 to 1945, 1,094 feature films were made in Germany, 
of which 914 were not political. Five hundred and twenty-three of these were musicals or 
                                                
12 Ibid, i. 
13 Ibid, 7. 
  10 
comedies, 123 were detective films and other crime dramas, and 295 were melodramas.14 
These genre films tended to look stylistically similar to those made in Hollywood. The 
fact is that comparatively few films produced in Nazi Germany were simply state ordered 
propaganda. The German film industry under Nazis was still above all else, an industry, 
and dependant on revenue in order to survive. As such, a film still had to be popular in 
addition to being propagandistic.   
Under the Nazi regime, every decision, no matter how ordinary took on a political 
aspect. The consequences of ordinary decisions in this context go beyond just the 
immediate results. If every choice a person made had a political meaning, then their 
choice of cinematic entertainment, and the resulting popularity of certain films, or types 
of films can be used to ascertain general reactions to the broader sociopolitical currents in 
National Socialist Germany. The popularity of specific films, or types of films, and the 
way they change over time offer a glimpse into how the citizens of Germany under the 
Nazis responded to the carefully crafted view of the world offered by the Nazi Party. 
As box office takes soared during the war, why were people drawn to the movie 
theater? Were they there to escape from the cares and concerns of wartime life? Did they 
attend to reaffirm their flagging allegiance to the party? Or were they attending because 
the theaters still had heat and running water? The aim here will be to look at cinema not 
only as the tool of Nazism in controlling minds and guiding thoughts, but also as a tool of 
the historian in understanding the success of Nazism in manipulating the hearts and 
minds of its subjects, both willing and unwilling alike. In a simple sense, whether or not 
to attend the cinema was one of the few political choices a person retained. Film is first 
                                                
14 Rentschler, The Ministry of Illusion, 7. 
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and foremost a consumer product, even in a state such as Nazi Germany. A film studio 
failing to make films that appeal to an audience wouldn’t be in business for long.  
Goebbels, as head of the German film industry, was of the opinion from the very 
beginning that “conveyor-belt brownshirt epics were box office poison.”15 The 
emergence of Nazi ideology was not a factor in drawing people to the cinema; instead 
they came seeking the solace in escapist fantasies that had drawn them to the cinema 
under Weimar and earlier, and to the theater before that. The Nazi Party polls that 
showed near unanimous support for Hitler present an easily contradicted picture of 
personal support for the Nazi regime, the same image intended to present the German 
people and the world with a view of the Third Reich united in synchronized goose-
stepping towards a utopian future. The same rosy view of Nazism is presented in most of 
the films actually set in National Socialist Germany. But the fact that films about Nazism 
made in Germany between 1933-1945 represent less then 10% of the total output for the 
period paints a different picture of what Germans were watching. German taste in film 
had always been, and continued to be, very diverse. 
Since the end of World War II and the collapse of the Nazi regime, many, if not 
most, of the films produced in Germany between 1933 and 1945 have remained in 
circulation as German cinema.  Despite the circumstances of their production, these films 
still have an audience. This would seem to indicate either that condemnation of Nazism is 
not universal, or that many of the films produced while the Nazis were in power have an 
appeal broader than their National Socialist origins. This is in part due to the very nature 
of Nazi control of the film industry. While Goebbels and the Ministry of Propaganda held 
                                                
15 Ibid, 9. 
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absolute control over what could and could not been made and shown, there was only so 
much he could do to influence public taste. The actual extent of his control was limited 
by the need to make commercially successful films. Much like the American 
entertainment industry that exists today, the success or failure of a film in Nazi Germany 
was largely at the mercy of filmgoers. If a particular film or genre proved unprofitable, 
the studio cut its losses and found a way to try and make the next picture more successful. 
The Germany film industry, despite the government control, remained an industry. It 
existed to provide mass entertainment that actually appealed to the masses. 
In order to achieve the greatest ideological impact, a film had to be both 
emotionally persuasive propaganda and appealing entertainment. Dr Joseph Goebbels, in 
his dual role as Minister of Popular Enlightenment and Propaganda as well as the head of 
the film industry, had to perform a balancing act, matching the regime’s needs of the 
moment to the German public’s changing capacity to receive and absorb his messages. 
Between 1933 and 1945, Goebbels learned to predict and manipulate popular shifts in 
sentiment with increasing success. As his initial efforts proved unsuccessful he 
established greater and greater personal control over the industry to preserve its financial 
stability through tighter control. In turning an entire industry into what amounted to a 
directly administrated entity under the Ministry for Popular Enlightenment and 
Propaganda (RMVP), as David Welch said, “…Goebbels justified the war, extolled the 
invincibility of German military might, romanticized its heroes, and, as Germany’s 
military position became more desperate, mythologized the nation’s 
Götterdammerung.”16  
                                                
16 Welch, Propaganda and the German Cinema, 1933-1945, 160. 
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The cinema of Nazi Germany, in addition to largely being the product of Nazi 
ideology, was also largely dependant upon the tastes and interests of the German filgoing 
public. Instead of looking at films as documents of Nazism, as has been already done, this 
paper will look at them both in terms of public opinion, and in the broader context of the 
state of the Nazi regime. While using the gross profit of a film as an indicator of its 
popularity presents a number of inherent difficulties, it does provide a previously 
unexplored view of public sentiment under the Nazi regime. It reveals that the German 
public had a healthy appetite for dramatic films, particularly during the early war years, 
and it reveals their susceptibility to propaganda. While other factors must be considered, 
the fact that many of the highest grossing films were state-sponsored propaganda epics 
suggests both the willingness of the film going public accept a Nazi view of the world 
and the degree of success Goebbels had tailoring his messages to the taste of the masses.  
 
Goebbels and Propaganda 
 
 The single most important figure in cinema during the Third Reich is undeniably 
Goebbels. A diminutive man with a clubfoot and leg brace, Goebbels was an early 
adherent of the Nazi Party, who quickly rose to power within the movement. In taking 
charge of the Nazi state’s public relations as the Minister of Popular Enlightenment and 
Propaganda, Goebbels was responsible for every form of mass media. In this capacity he 
took on the seemingly daunting task of inculcating the masses with Nazi ideology. 
 Goebbels had a major advantage in the form of the initial support, which had 
swept Hitler into the Chancellorship; many Germans were already sympathetic to the 
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Nazi Party, and the prejudices underlying Nazi ideology had a long German history. 
Instead of trying to impose new ideas, he simply had to excite themes such as 
nationalism, patriotism, and others that had long resonated with Germans. The sense of 
belonging to a greater German community was a powerful uniting force; so were the 
“racial enemies” of Germany whom Goebbels sought to direct the nation against. 
 Building on existing sentiments, it was easy for Goebbels to achieve a connection 
with the public on the basis of their “Germanness.” As he explained in his diary, “In the 
long run basic results in influencing the public will be achieved only by the man who is 
able to reduce problems to the most simple terms and who has the courage to keep 
forever repeating them in this simplified form…”17 By communicating ideas in the 
simplest, most emotional form, and repeating them constantly on all available mediums, 
Goebbels felt he was in a prime position to influence public opinion. 
 Under Goebbels, what we would today term as news, entertainment and 
propaganda became increasingly hard to distinguish from one another. He was of the 
opinion that overt propaganda had far less persuasive power than if it was presented in an 
artistic or dramatic context, such as a film. As such the viewer was much less aware that 
they were the subjects of manipulation. Goebbels was also a tremendous film enthusiast, 
and often highly concerned with the artistic merits of the films Germany produced.18 His 
personal goal was to was to produce a German equivalent to Sergei Eisenstein’s 
Battleship Potemkin (1925,)19 of which he said:  
                                                
17 Louis P. Lochner, The Goebbels Diaries. (Garden City, Doubleday, 1948), 22.  
18 Welch, Propaganda and the German Cinema, 12. 
19 Stephen Brockman, A Critical History of the German Cinema, (Rochester: Camden 
House, 2010), 135. 
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“This is a marvelous film without equal in the cinema. The 
reason is its power of conviction. Anyone who had no 
political conviction could become a Bolshevik after seeing 
the film. It shows very clearly that a work of art can be 
tendentious and even the worst kind of ideas can be 
propagated, if this is done through the medium of an 
outstanding work of art.”20 
 
Goebbels took advantage of all the available mediums to spread Nazi ideology. In 
addition to feature films he oversaw the print media, the radio, and the production of 
newsreels, all of which played a role in his propaganda strategy. 
 One of Goebbel’s earliest experiences with the party had been running a 
newspaper called The Attack (Der Angriff) in Berlin during 1926.21 In portraying events 
as the Nazis saw them, he established the technique of reporting ideology as news that 
German newspapers were to follow after he took control of the press. While newspapers 
could report on something within a day of it happening, they were quickly outstripped by 
the radio. Perhaps the quickest means of dispersing news and propaganda, “Radio was a 
powerful tool in the Nazi campaign to coordinate all cultural activities and the flow of 
information. Soon after his appointment as propaganda minister, Goebbels stressed the 
value of radio in disseminating ideas and declared it ‘the most modern and most 
important instrument for influencing the masses.’”22 The medium allowed the rapid, one-
way transmission of news and ideological content, along with diversionary entertainment. 
Goebbels insisted on the manufacture of cheap, affordable radio receiver sets; by 1936, 
half of all German households owned a radio. While German state radio was centralized 
                                                
20 From Goebbels’ speech to the Filmwelt on March 28, 1933, as quoted in Welch, 
Propaganda and the German Cinema, 12. 
21 Randall Bytwerk, Landmark Speeches of National Socialism, (College Station: Texas 
A&M University Press, 2008), 32 
22 O’Brien, Nazi Cinema as Enchantment: The Politics of Entertainment in the Third 
Reich, 122. 
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and therefore could be easily controlled, radio sets could also be used to listen to banned 
foreign broadcasts, an act punishable by imprisonment or even death.23  
 Despite the speed with which they could deliver news and ideology, neither the 
radio nor the newspaper could match the visual mediums of the newsreel and the feature 
film in terms of effectiveness and emotional impact. Newsreels were produced and 
released on a regular basis, providing a visual summary of recent events with a Nazi 
ideological slant. Usually shown before a feature film, the newsreel was often more 
ideologically charged than the film it preceded.  
Beginning with the Nazi’s rise to power in 1933, Goebbels proceeded to bring the 
entire German film industry under his personal control.24 In doing so he faced a delicate 
proposition. If he moved to quickly, he risked alienating established studio heads and 
producers who possessed enormous clout in the industry and faced financial ruin in the 
event of a state takeover. On the other hand, if he moved too slowly he left the industry 
open to the influence of his rivals, most notably Gregor Strasser, another Nazi leader in 
Berlin, but generally the more radical elements in the party who came to pose a threat to 
Hitler’s leadership in the early 1930s. A number of these were prominent members of the 
Sturmabteilung (Storm Troopers, or SA), the brown shirt thugs whose violent street war 
against the Communists had significantly aided the rise of the party. Their interest in the 
film industry arose primarily from a desire to see their own exploits dramatized on 
celluloid.25 Their interference was especially problematic for Goebbels, who in addition 
to his efforts to control the production of propaganda, had been tasked by Hitler with 
                                                
23 Ibid, 121-23 
24 Welch, Propaganda and the German Cinema, 1933-1945, 8. 
25 Ibid, 74. 
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gaining control of the more rebellious elements of the party. Goebbels ultimately 
prevailed by maintaining his loyalty to the Fuehrer: when Hitler eliminated his rivals on 
the Night of the Long Knives in 1934, he eliminated Goebbels’ rivals too.  
Goebbel’s control of the film industry was implemented through dual party and 
state apparatuses, similar to many other institutions in Nazi Germany.26 For example the 
state controlled Wehrmacht (Armed Forces) existed as a separate organization from the 
party run SA and SS, despite their overlapping spheres of influence and share 
membership.27 The controlling bodies for the film industry were the party’s Reich 
Culture Chamber, (Reichkulturkammer, RKK) and the state’s Ministry for Popular 
Enlightenment and Propaganda. While each body operated independent of the other and 
controlled a different aspect of the industry, they were both answered directly to 
Goebbels. 
The Nazi party apparatus, the film chamber of the Reich Culture Chamber 
(Reichsfilmkammer, RFK) was responsible for policing film industry personnel. In May 
of 1933, the Nazis enacted a ban on all trade unions, including the film union DACHO 
(Dach-Organisation der Filmschaffenden Deutschlands e.V., Controlling Body of the 
Film Workers of Germany.) In order to continue working in the film industry in any 
capacity, all employees had to join the RFK. In order to join one had to prove Aryan 
ancestry.28 The intention and effect of this policy was to exclude Jews and anyone else 
considered to be racially impure from involvement in the film industry.  
                                                
26 Roger Manvell and Heinrich Fraenkel, The German Cinema, (New York: Praeger 
Publishers, 1971), 69. 
27 George H. Stein, The Waffen SS: Hitler’s Elite Guard at War, 1939-1945, (Ithica: 
Cornell University Press, 1984.), 18 
28 Welch, Propaganda and the German Cinema, 1933-1945, 9-10. 
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The removal of persons of Jewish descent dealt the German film industry a severe 
blow. They represented a sizable portion of the actors, directors, and screenwriters, and 
were directly responsible for many of the renowned films made during the Weimar 
period, such as Fritz Lang, director of Metropolis (1927) and M (1931).29 However, as it 
was deemed necessary by Nazi ideology, the removal of Jews (Entjudung) from all 
aspects of the film industry was undertaken within months of Hitler assuming the 
Chancellorship, and the result in many areas including the film industry was a large drop 
in the number of skilled laborers. Despite the deleterious effects of these policies, the 
major studios retained enough of a talent pool eligible to join the RFK so as to allow 
them to remain in business.30  
While the party controlled who could work for the film industry, the state 
controlled the actual production of films, which was done under the auspices of the 
Ministry for Popular Enlightenment and Propaganda (RMVP), which assumed 
responsibility for funding all film production in Germany. Initially, Goebbels pursued a 
simple yet effective policy to earn the loyalty of film producers and studio executives: he 
offered them guaranteed access to credit.31 In exchange for guaranteed funding, they were 
simply required to produce films they that met Goebbel’s stringent ideological 
requirements.  
To meet these obligations, the Film Credit Bank (Filmkreditbank) was established 
in June of 1933 to provide funding for film production in Germany. Under Goebbels, it 
was the only source of credit available to film studios. It was intended to be a low profit 
                                                
29 Brockman, A Critical History of the German Cinema, 127. 
30 Welch, Propaganda and the German Cinema, 1933-1945, 12. 
31 Ibid, 25. 
  19 
venture, for the sole purpose of consolidating financial control over the film industry. A 
producer would be required to raise enough funds to cover 30% of the production costs, 
and the bank would put up the rest. The bank would then own the rights to the finished 
film, until the film earned back the production costs, at which point the studio was 
entitled to the profits. While initially conceived of to fund all film production in 
Germany, in practice the FKB dealt primarily with the larger studios that could guarantee 
wider distribution. By 1936, the FKB was funding 73% of feature films produced in 
Germany (the remainder were privately financed.) These policies effectively limited the 
opportunities smaller studios had to secure financial aid for new projects, and made it 
more difficult to profit from any films they were able produce. This was typical of 
Goebbels’ attitude towards the film industry, favoring larger entities he could control 
with less effort over smaller, more diverse operations that were more easily able to slip 
around the censorship rules he imposed. Overall, the Reich Credit Bank greatly expanded 
the Nazi monopoly over the industry.32 
Any film financed by the RKB, and therefore any film produced in Nazi 
Germany, was required to pass stringent ideological censorship. This was not only to 
weed out films that contained themes antithetical to Nazism, but also to ensure that any 
film that passed censorship was presented in the best and most timely, and therefore most 
profitable, fashion possible, given Goebbels’ changing propaganda goals. Censorship was 
practiced at three phases during production. First, the filmmaker submitted a treatment or 
scenario of the film so the general themes could be analyzed. If the treatment passed 
muster, a full script would be submitted for approval. If the script was found to be 
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ideologically correct, the project would be funded and production could commence. In 
many cases Goebbels would oversee the process personally, especially for films produced 
at the state’s request. After a film was shot and edited, it was submitted for a censorship a 
third time. Upon passing for the final time, a film would be given final permission for 
distribution and exhibition. However, funding and permission to continue could be 
revoked at any stage in the process, and for any reason.33 While this created a great deal 
of uncertainty for producers, ultimately most films were passed without major alterations. 
In large part this was thanks to the studio’s willingness to accommodate Goebbels. The 
racial requirements for employment in the film industry had effectively weeded out most 
of the filmmakers and who might have voiced objections, and those who remained were 
largely willing to engage in self-censorship. Given the choice between artistic limitations 
and professional excommunication, most chose to keep their jobs and accept Goebbels’ 
promise of guaranteed funding for approved projects. 34 
Goebbels was able to bring the film industry under his personal oversight with 
relative ease. His struggle to limit the influence exerted by other members of the Party 
was much more protracted.35 The Nazi Party had a history of filming and distributing 
propaganda in regional, decentralized fashion. In 1933 and early 1934 this tradition 
continued with a series of  films commissioned by and about the SA and Hitler Youth, 
later dubbed the Martyr Trilogy. Effectively produced outside Goebbels’ purview, the 
studios behind these films produced them as an overture to the new Nazi government, 
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and promptly drew Goebbels ire.36 Using his powers as the Minister of Propaganda, 
Goebbels’ attempts at banning these films were only foiled by the film studio’s concerns 
that they would be unable to recoup their investments if the films could not be shown. 
While he ultimately relented, the situation provides a clear example of exactly why 
Goebbels felt the need for a law to solidify his power within the party while more 
explicitly stating his position to the film community. On the one hand, he needed to 
reassure the industry that he would not ban films in an arbitrary fashion. On the other, he 
had to show his rivals he would tolerate no interference (excepting, of course, the wishes 
of his superiors, primarily Hitler.)  
Hitlerjunge Quex 
Hitlerjunge Quex (1933) is a retelling of the death of Herbert Norkus, a Hitler Youth 
(Hitlerjugend or HJ) killed by the Communists in 1932.37 Considered the second 
installment in the Nazi “Martyr Trilogy” of films about young Nazis who sacrifice their 
lives for cause, released in 1933-1934. The film’s focus is on the HJ instead of the SA 
like the other two points of the trilogy--SA-Mann Brand (1933)38 and Hans Westmar 
(1934)39--do. Of the three films, Hitlerjunge Quex received the best official reception. In 
the months after the Nazis took power in January 1933, the German film industry was 
unsure how the new government would enforce regulations or what sort of films it 
wished to see produced. In the 1920s, the Nazi Party produced its own film propaganda at 
the city- and regional level, with individual Gauleiters (regional leader) overseeing the 
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production of their own documentaries and newsreels.40 There was a great deal of 
confusion as to who would assume control of the industry. Out of the fractious chaos, 
emerged one Dr Joseph Goebbels, the Gauleiter of Berlin. Using his personal access to 
Hitler, he was able to establish the Ministry for Popular Enlightenment and Propaganda 
with himself as its minister on March 13, 1933, within months of the Nazi ascension to 
power. The position allowed him to begin consolidating his control over the film 
industry. The film industry, like so many other commercial interests in Germany, 
generally acquiesced to the Nazi’s wishes. In fact, the biggest obstacle Goebbels faced in 
his drive for complete control over German culture and media was not resistance from 
filmmakers, but was from other party members with competing agendas. The leaders of 
organizations such as the SA were keen to see their exploits splashed across the big 
screen. SA-Mann Brand was a project undertaken by a smaller production company, 
Bavaria Film,41 while Hans Westmar was produced under the patronage of high-ranking 
members of the SA.42 However by the time the two came were ready for release, 
Goebbels was already cementing his position as Propaganda Minister. Viewing the SA 
films as a direct challenge to his authority, he promptly had them banned. Officially, he 
criticized them as being poor works of art, produced by incompetent directors and crews. 
While he was in fact concerned about the artistic quality of the films Germany was 
producing, the real reasons for his opposition were much more political. Goebbels sought 
every means available to solidify his position was as head of the German film 
community. Hindering his opponents, while petty, served as a successful stalling tactic, 
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especially in light of the deteriorating situation between Hitler and the leadership of the 
SA. By opposing films about the Kampfzeit (time of struggle, loosely 1919-33) and the 
SA Storm Troopers, he expanded not only his growing control of the film industry, but 
also his favor with Hitler immediately following the purge of the SA leadership during 
the Night of the Long Knives in early July, 1934. Ultimately, all three films were released 
and awarded prizes (Predikäte). While all three were financially successful, Goebbels 
allowed no further films about the SA, and just to be safe, he refused to produce films 
about any other Nazi organization.43  
From the very first scene, Hitlerjunge Quex establishes the two forces vying for 
the soul of Germany: Nazism and Communism, two rival forces trying win the hearts and 
minds of Germans for diametrically different purposes. The film is quick to establish that 
these rivals oppose each other not only on the political spectrum, but also in a moral 
sense: Nazism represents order and the assured survival of Germany, while Communism 
represents anarchy, revolution and the complete abandonment of German values.44 The 
film further cements this duality on a subconscious level, always presenting the Nazis in 
orderly rows and columns, while the communists are invariably a disorderly mob.  
 In the central conflict of the film, Heine Völker is drawn as an analogy to 
Germany, over whose soul the forces of good and evil wage battle. Heine, torn between 
his communist, alcoholic father and the Nazis he yearns to march alongside, is strictly the 
honorable sort and greatly admired by both sides. Both Communists and Nazis want to 
win him over, but go about it in very different ways. The Communists try a number of 
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unsuccessful methods, offering Heine bribes, pressuring his father to enroll him in the 
communist youth group, and finally threatening his life if he continues to support the 
Nazis. The Nazis, whom Heine implicitly supports since his first encounter with them, 
are presented as forthright, upstanding citizens with nation’s best interests at heart. Heine 
seeks out members of the Hitler Youth troop he encountered previously, who are initially 
suspicious of him, though some members express a desire to let him join. After Heine 
earns their trust, they joyfully accept them as one their own, as he repeatedly proves his 
worth to the Hitler Youth. 
In his role as a cinematic proxy for Germany, Heine is shown as upstanding and 
righteous amongst all others. Even the Communists show respect for his loyalty. But 
even as they seek to corrupt into their own cause they are too late; his loyalty has always 
leaned towards the Nazis, despite sympathy for the Internationale inherited from his 
father. To pursue the analogy to its fullest extent, Germany, the greatest country among 
nations, finds itself torn between the Nazis and the Communists, and in choosing the 
former earns the enmity of the latter. In siding with the Nazis, Germany has found itself 
in the company of those who understand his struggles and aspirations. But just as 
Germany finds himself on the verge of a Nazi victory, the communists stab it- and Heine- 
in the back in the dark of night. As Heine dies in the arms of his comrades, he ascends to 
be reborn in spirit- like Germany, leading his people towards the age of National 
Socialism and the ascendance of the Führer. 
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Figure 1: Heine Völker dies in the arms of his comrades, prophesizing the rise of the 
Führer. Souce: Hitlerjunge Quex, dir. Franz Seitz. 
 
In the same way Heine represents Germany, the film’s plot is a retelling of the 
events of the Great War (or World War I), with the Nazis cast as the natural successors to 
the Second Reich, and Hitler to the Kaiser. Germany and its noble leaders, on the verge 
of victory, were stabbed in the back by Communists, Jews and other foreigners who 
conspired to bring about Germany’s defeat through cowardly, surreptitious measures.45  
Hitlerjunge Quex provides a useful commentary on Nazi theories regarding 
ideology. Communists such as Heine’s father or the youth leader Stoppel are portrayed 
not as inflexible ideologues, but as thinking, feeling, people capable of being swayed by 
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reason. Heine’s father is a World War I veteran who got shot, and turned to alcohol and 
communism to alleviate both the pain in his leg and the pain of Germany’s loss. But the 
film makes it clear at this early stage in Nazi rule that simply being a Communist and a 
member of the Internationale doesn’t mean he is beyond redemption. As his son is drawn 
to the Hitler Youth, he demonstrates increasing sympathy for the Nazi Party, allowing his 
son to join and even voicing National Socialist sentiments to his friend Stoppel. Stoppel, 
the leader of a communist youth group, is a stronger adherent to communism than Herr 
Völker. He initiates Heine into the Internationale, but immediately finds him difficult to 
control. While he resents the trouble caused by Heine’s headstrong ways, he admires the 
boy’s courage and potential. As Heine causes further trouble for the communists, Stoppel 
repeatedly threatens to kill him but finds himself unable to carry out the threat. His 
loyalty shifts away from the Internationale towards Heine, as he lies to his fellow 
Communists to protect the boy. But before he can progress from sympathy for Heine to 
support for the Nazis, Heine is murdered. While Stoppel never finds redemption during 
the film, he poses a degree of humanity rare for a communist character. Later villains are 
drawn much more one-dimensionally, bent solely on the defeat and destruction of the 
sympathetic Aryan characters. 
The racial treatment of characters is very different from later films. Many later 
films, notable virulently anti-Semitic propaganda films such as Der Ewige Jude (1940) 
and Jud Süß (1940) portrayed the Jewish villains as caricatures, complete with hooked 
noses, swarthy complexions, and full beards. Alternately they appeared as Marxist 
intellectuals who had shed the obvious trappings of their “race” to better infiltrate and 
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undermine society.46 However, in 1933 the image of the Jew isn’t nearly as terrifying. 
The sole Jewish character in Hitlerjunge Quex, Heine’s boss Herr Kowalski, is depicted 
as a miser whose sole interest is money, and who believes haggling over prices is work. 
He also buys most of the Völker’s furniture after the death of Frau Völker, paying Herr 
Volker a pittance for most of his possessions. However his obviously non-German name 
and his obsession with money, Herr Kowalski possesses no “Jewish” characteristics, and 
seems to bear stronger resemblance to Heinrich Himmler than to later Nazi incarnations 
of the villainous Jew.47 The implication is that Jews are less of an immediate threat to 
Germany than the communists. 
The uncertainty surrounding Goebbels’ policies had a disruptive effect on the film 
industry. Financing a production was a risky endeavor when the film could be cancelled 
at any time based upon Goebbels’ whim. The business of film production could not be 
continued as usual under the conditions that existed from mid-1933 until early 1934. 
Simply offering easy, though conditional access to credit was not enough to entice 
filmmakers to accept Goebbels’ terms when those terms were nebulously defined. Unable 
to justify new ventures, German film studios were largely shut down in early 1934, 
awaiting passage of new film legislation. The Reich Cinema Law, enacted in April 1934, 
clarified Goebbels position and made clearer the conditions under which a film would 
receive approval, while simultaneously granting Goebbels the freedom act with 
omnipotence as he saw fit.48  
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In his drive to assert complete control over the film industry, Goebbels seems to 
have harbored a particular dislike for films featuring the various party organs of the 
NSDAP. This proved true not only of early fiction films like those comprising the martyr 
trilogy, but also but also later films like Victory in the West (Sieg im Westen,1941) a 
documentary produced by the German army, the Wehrmacht. This was primarily due to 
the fact that any party organization represented in a film inevitably demanded more input 
than Goebbels was willing to allow.49  
Passed on February 16, 1934, the Reich Cinema Law established the basic policy 
upon which Goebbels planned to encourage the production of a National Socialist 
cinema. This employed a carrot and stick approach: “good” films, which displayed 
National Socialist tendencies and fit within Goebbels’ broader propaganda goals, would 
be awarded any number of prizes, or marks of distinction. For each one received, the tax 
on box office receipts was reduced by a specific amount. On the other hand, the law also 
increased the number of reasons for which a film could be barred from distribution. All 
scripts were to be thoroughly examined before a production was approved; failing to 
meet Goebbels’ stringent ideological requirements was grounds for immediate 
suspension of the project.50 The new law cemented RMVP control over the film industry, 
and Goebbels absolute authority to control film production. While in theory the law 
specified the reasons for which a film could be banned, in practice Goebbels always had 
absolute authority to do as he pleased.  
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Many producers and other film industry executives were very anxious regarding 
the viability of future productions in the period leading up to the passage of the law.51 
Goebbels’ appeared to be censoring films in an arbitrary and mercurial fashion, and no 
one knew who would be the next target of his ire. Their perception of Goebbels aside, he 
actually showed a degree of restraint in that he allowed most films that passed scrutiny 
during production to go on and premiere and then into general release. His goal was to 
maintain the profitability, and thereby the loyalty, of the industry. At the same time, he 
conducted censorship on the basis of ideology and took swift action against any film 
failing to pass muster. While his intentions may have initially been misunderstood,  
Goebbels sought films that expressed what he deemed as the proper National Socialist 
tendencies at the proper times.  
Before the Nazi ascension, foreign film rental fees made up a significant 
percentage of box office receipts. However after 1933 foreign income dropped off 
alarmingly, prompting a great deal of concern. Financial reports dating from this period 
indicate this drop was expected to be temporary. Welch theorizes Goebbels delayed the 
complete nationalization of the film industry in part to boost export value of films with 
the continued perception that German film was still an independent artistic and 
commercial endeavor. If this were indeed the case, Goebbels would have hoped to 
maintain German’s reputation as the second largest and respected film industry in the 
world, behind only the United States. If he had been successful, the result would have 
been increased foreign revenue to fund German rearmament.52 This explanation also 
provides another possible reason for the abrupt end of non-documentary feature films 
                                                
51 Ibid 73. 
52 Welch, Propaganda and the German Cinema, 1933-1945, 23. 
  30 
explicitly glorifying the Nazi party: so-called jackboot cinema. While achieving a limited 
resonance in Nazi Germany, such cinema was nowhere near as popular in countries 
governed by non-fascist regimes Ultimately, however, the lack of foreign interest in 
German films led to an increased need for domestic profits, and contributed to the film 
industry’s continuing financial instability. By the latter half of the 1930s, Goebbels was 
forced to take action again, further nationalizing the film industry, spurred by concerns 
over falling box office receipts and rising production costs.  
1936-1939 
In 1936 UFA and Tobis, the two largest German studios, were consolidated into a 
single entity called Katio Treuhand GmbH.53 Both companies were secretly and 
indirectly state controlled (staatsmittelbar). Publicly, each still behaved as an 
independent corporation, when in reality both companies’ boards were controlled by the 
state. Additionally, assets were taken from each and combined into a new production 
company called Terrakunst GmbH. Along with the studios, the system for financing films 
was reorganized as Film Finanz GmbH, which took on all the functions of the older 
Reich Kredit Bank. By 1939 nearly every German film studio, as well as those in Austria 
and Czechoslovakia were indirectly controlled by the State. By 1941 these companies 
were responsible for 70% of all feature film production in the greater German Reich.54 
 1938 Goebbels established the German Film Academy (Deutsche Filmakademie) 
to train new actors, directors, writers and technicians.55 It served to feed new employees 
into the film industry, and was perhaps a response to the large numbers of skilled 
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technicians who fled to other countries, particularly to the United States. However it was 
to become increasingly important several years later, as the war effort required larger and 
larger numbers of soldiers, and the resulting draft lead to a serious shortage of available 
personell.  
The reorganization of the film industry, despite the increased control it gave 
Goebbels, was not primarily about consolidating his power. Goebbels was already the 
unrivaled leader of the film industry, and had been since 1934. Internal and external 
interference was no longer a major concern. So it seems the single greatest reason for 
increased state intervention was concern over rising production costs, coupled with 
falling box office sales. Goebbels personal motivations aside, it isn’t a coincidence that 
the methods he used to restore the industry to profitability also served to greatly 
expanded his control over it. His policies focused on stabilizing the larger studios, 
intervening to control costs in the same fashion as he already controlled content. But by 
focusing exclusively on the larger studios, he ignored the similar problems faced by 
smaller production companies. The net result was the smaller companies were forced to 
shut down, while the remaining, larger studios found themselves even further under state 
control.56  
 Because of their often lengthy production times, Goebbels felt films were best 
suited to explaining decisions and policy already in place.  He hoped to curry the 
emotional support of the masses for controversial Nazi programs. One of the most 
notable examples of this, Ich klage an (I Accuse, 1941)57 portrayed the euthanasia 
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campaign as the plight of a husband who wants to spare his terminally ill wife a slow 
death. The film makes a personal appeal to the audience, depicting euthanasia as merciful 
act to prevent unnecessary suffering. It was entirely irrelevant to Goebbels that the film 
ignored the reality of the T4 program, where people were killed based on a doctor’s 
recommendations, without their own or their families consent. The film was to raise 
support for the program, not awareness. Released after the T4 program had gained public 
notoriety, Ich Klage an was intended to “explain” the policy after the fact, or at least 
make it seem emotionally justifiable. 
The War 1939-1942 
With the outbreak of war, Goebbels began to commission larger, more expensive 
epics with the specific intent of improving the artistic output of the German film industry, 
thereby hoping to improve box office performance.58 He also took further steps to 
nationalize the film industry, consolidating the Kautio Treuhand trust into a single new 
studio that shared the name UFA with the earlier studio, and called UFI to distinguish it. 
The entire process of nationalization had been simply left out of the news to keep it secret 
from the public, and the new, single organization maintained the same public faces so as 
to keep even the studio’s employees unaware of the state’s new role as owner of the film 
industry.59 After 1942, the organization and structure of the industry remained largely 
unchanged until the end of the war. While the nationalization made it easier for the state 
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to keep tighter control over production costs, state-sponsored films continued to receive 
increasingly large budgets, which they regularly overran.  
The war brought about a shift in Goebbels’ cinematic propaganda, away from 
merely encouraging support for Nazi policy towards agitational stumping for the war 
effort; however the public’s taste in films remained largely unchanged.60 While Goebbels 
encouraged films vilifying the enemy, Germans demonstrated a continued preference for 
dramas, not propaganda films. However Goebbels was at least partially successful, in that 
a fair number of these films combined dramatic and ideological elements. The popular 
films from the early war years (by gross profit) reveal that although Germans’ film 
preferences remained consistent, they were also receptive to Goebbels’ propaganda 
efforts. 
In considering the twenty most popular films made between 1938 and 1940 period 
(the five most popular from each year,) at least half can be characterized as dramas of one 
type or another, mostly either historical or melodramas.61 The term drama is used in a 
very general sense to describe a very diverse range of films, including some that could 
also be characterized as romantic films, period pieces, biographical films, and blatant 
propaganda. Many films defy simple generic categories, and share the conventions of two 
or three different categories. 
One of the most prominent trends is the sudden drop in popularity of adventure 
films after 1938, which disappear in 1939, followed by the rise in popularity of historical 
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drama and films set in a contemporary Germany in 1940 and 1941.62 This would seem 
indicative of a loss of interest in fictional tales of heroism at a time when Germany stood 
poised to conquer Europe. Stories of adventure and courage under fire were no longer 
merely products of the imagination. The film going public was more interested in seeing 
films about current events, and responded very positively to Goebbels’ policy of 
capitalizing on military victories to encourage patriotism and support for the war effort. 
As important as historical dramas were films about current events, most notably 
about the ‘evil’ British, with whom tensions were rising in the period leading up to the 
outbreak of war.  During the period when Britain and Germany maintained an uneasy 
state of peace, a popular film such as Kautschuk (India Rubber, 1938) portrayed the 
British in a positive light. One of the last  Nazi adventure films, India Rubber features a 
young Englishman who risks everything to break the Brazilian monopoly on natural 
rubber.63 
However, films about the British were not necessarily popular with the German 
film viewing public.  In the year war broke out, 1939, no films featuring the British 
appeared in the top five for box office receipts. However in 1940, after the outbreak of 
war, the tone of the films changed entirely. Films with British heroes were replaced with 
films portraying the British callous, cruel and power hungry. The popular film Das Herz 
der Königen (Heart of the Queen, 1940) portrayed the reign of Mary, Queen of Scots and 
her execution at the hands of English tyrants.64 Ohm Krüger (Uncle Krüger, 1941) 
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dramatizes the Boer War, portraying the British as uncaring, greedy capitalists who 
conspire to seize South Africa from the gentle Dutch and German colonists already living 
there. 65 The popularity of these films suggests a generally hostile attitude towards the 
British, and a German public willing to believe wartime propaganda vilifying their 
adversary. 
Beyond demonizing the British enemy, beginning in 1941, documentaries about 
the German armed forces also became popular.66 The rapid string of victories in Poland, 
the Low Countries (Holland, Belgium and Luxembourg,) Denmark, Norway and France 
during the first two years of the war were easily adapted into exciting films about the war 
effort. Sieg im Westen (Victory in the West, 1941) was a documentary film about the 
Army’s victory in France.67 Produced entirely under the auspices of the Army, it was 
intended to showcase the strength of the German military and the general superiority of 
German weapons, which are required because Germany is beset by enemies on all sides. 
The film gave Hitler and the Nazi Party very little credit for the victory, and thereby 
earned Goebbels’ ire.68 Similarly, U-Boote westwärts (Submarines Westward, 1941) 
featured the lives of real U-boat crews, as they prepared to put out to sea and engaged the 
British in daring naval battles.69 It was shot on location in the North Atlantic. Unlike 
Victory in the West, it was produce by UFA, and therefore had Goebbels’ approval before 
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release.70  The popular success of these films illustrates the public’s interest in the armed 
forces, and the success of the war effort.  
In 1940, the second most popular film in Germany was Jud Süss, a virulently anti-
Semitic propaganda.71 Directed by Veit Harlan, it sought to demonstrate how Jews were 
dangerous to society, both in terms of what they would do to governments and 
economies, and the sexual threat they posed to Aryan women. This and other anti-Semitic 
films were released in 1939 and 1940, coinciding with the mass deportation of German 
Jews to the east. The intent was entirely to justify the actions taken against Jews, and of 
course to draw historical parallels demonstrating the necessity of the measures. 72  
The immediate implication of the film’s popularity would seem to be that on the 
whole, Germans believed what the government was saying about Jews, and supported 
their removal from society. While the exact extent to which this was true is unlikely to 
ever be discerned, another possibility lies with the high production value of films like Jud 
Süss. And this union of ideological message and high production value was not 
accidental.  As one of Goebbels’ favorite directors, Harlan was assigned projects 
considered of high value to the state. His films were given unrestricted access to funding 
and resources, and are consequently among the most lavish and expensive films produced 
during the Third Reich, in addition to being some of the most ideological.73 It is therefore 
necessary to consider that people who went to see a film like Jud Süss were not just there 
to see an anti-Semitic film, but instead a “good” film, given Harlan’s reputation. 
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However the film’s readily apparent subject matter also suggests that a potential viewer 
would choose to see this film based on existing prejudices, which stood only to be 
reinforced in viewing it. 
 
Year of 
Release Title GBO Studio Genre 
1938 Pour le Merite 3800 UFA Drama/Propaganda 
1938 Der Blaufuchs 2400 UFA Melodrama 
1938 - 2025 Terra - 
1938 Sergeant Berry 1850 Tobis Western/Adventure 
1938 Kautschuk 1800 UFA Adventure 
1939 
Es War eine rauschende 
Ballnacht 4600 UFA Melodrama 
1939 Robert Koch 4500 Tobis Drama/Biogprahy 
1939 Opernball 3900 Terra Comedy 
1939 - 3800 Terra - 
1939 Der ewige Quell 3500 Bavaria Drama 
1940 Wunschkonzert 7200 UFA Melodrama/Propaganda 
1940 Jud Süss 6200 Terra Drama/Propaganda 
1940 Bismark 4400 Tobis Historical Drama 
1940 Herz der Königen 4000 UFA Historical Drama 
1940 Die Geierwally 3800 Tobis Melodrama 
1941 Ohm Krüger 5500 Tobis Historical Drama 
1941 …reitet für Deutschland 5000 UFA Drama/Propaganda 
1941 Seig im Westen 4500 UFA Documentary/Propaganda 
1941 Der Weg ins Freie 4500 UFA Melodrama 
1941 U-boats westwärte 4000 UFA Documentary/Propaganda 
Table 1: The Five Most Popular Films in Germany, 1938-194174 
 
While the most popular type of film from this period was definitively dramas, the 
outbreak of war seems to have brought about an interest in Historical dramas, which 
tended to dramatize the lives of great geniuses or visionaries, depicting their tenacity and 
resolve in pursuing their personal vision. Examples include Robert Koch (1939,) 
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depicting the famous doctor’s career as a crusade against death. Dr Koch is forced to 
overcome the reactionary tendencies of lesser minds in order to successfully find a cure 
for tuberculosis.75 It could be described as demonstrating National socialist tendencies 
and ideology: the hero is a man of destiny who must labor to save the masses from 
themselves. It was a Roaring Ball Night (Es war eine Rauschende Ballnacht, 1939) was a 
popular melodrama about the Russian composer Tchaikovsky’s struggle to write his 
master opus. It was released in November of 1939, shortly after the signing of the 
Molotov Ribbentrop Non-Aggression Pact of August 1939,76 however only 
circumstantial evidence supports a connection between the historic agreement with 
Russia and a film about a notable Russian figure. While it is a film about a historical 
figure, it also features a melodramatic plot about a fictional and tragically brief romance 
between the composer and a young ballerina who is his only admirer, cut short by 
Tchaikovsky’s death.77 This is somewhat ironic in light of the fact that in reality the 
composer was gay.78  
If in the period 1938-1939, films about the British were not very popular and soft 
in their criticism, more virulent anti-British propaganda became popular after the war 
broke out. This cannot be wholly attributed to the changing interests of the German 
public, as virtually no anti-British films were released until after Britain and Germany 
became belligerents. A film could take anywhere between several months and a year 
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from the time it was approved until the time it was released. State ordered films typically 
took the longest, because they often involved a considerable amount of re-shooting to 
ensure the proper ideological message. This is characteristic example of Goebbels’ 
approach to film propaganda: after seizing upon German victories to build nationalistic 
fervor using more prompt forms of propaganda, feature films which alternately 
demonized and ridiculed the British continued to shill for the German war effort. Anti-
British propaganda seems to have been well received by the German public; feature films 
such as Heart of the Queen (Herz der Königen) portrayed the British as cruel tyrants, 
uncaring capitalists in Titanic or heartless imperialists in Uncle Krüger (Ohm Krüger, 
1941) proved popular beginning in 1940. In keeping with Goebbels’ philosophies of 
using art to deliver propaganda, none of these films concerned the ongoing war effort 
against the British. Instead they portrayed the British as a people devoid of ethics or 
morals, often directly contrasted with the völkisch values of the Germans who suffer 
horribly due to British greed. Like all anti-enemy feature films produced under Goebbels’ 
charge, they provided an emotional argument for the necessity of a war against the 
British, largely divorced from historical fact. Anti-British propaganda films were 
produced until 1943, ending with Titanic. 
Wunschkonzert 
The popularity of melodramas seems to have been an enduring facet of German 
cinema, appearing amongst the top five most popular films every year between 1938 and 
1941. The genre included the two most popular films produced during the Third Reich: 
The Great Love (Die Grosse Liebe 1942)79 and Wunshckonzert (1940.) Not only are they 
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both melodramas, their remarkable similar plots both concern a pair of lovers separated 
by war, who, against all odds, manage to find each other by the end of the film. 
Wunschzonzert (Request Concert, 1940)80 was the most popular film of 1940, and 
the second most popular film ever produced in Nazi Germany based on box office 
receipts81. While The Great Love was more successful, Wunschkonzert established their 
shared formula. In essence the film is a melodrama, but the film blurs genre boundaries in 
that it is also a musical and a comedy, and undeniably a propaganda piece. It was 
produced at the personal request of Goebbels, based upon a series of weekly radio shows 
of the same name. Held every Sunday afternoon, these Request Concerts allowed soldiers 
stationed on the front to request favorite songs to share with loved ones back home. In 
theory the concerts connected the soldiers on the front to the civilians at home, allowing 
for a greater People’s Community (Volksgemeinschaft.) The broadcasts were a popular 
success, and Goebbels felt that a feature film based on the radio show would provide a 
significant boost in his efforts to drum up support for the war. 
 The film’s plot revolves around a young couple, Herbert and Inge, who meet and 
fall in love during the 1936 Berlin Olympics. He is an officer in the Luftwaffe, but with 
no sign of war on the horizon, they plan to get married and start a family. Suddenly 
Herbert receives a call to report for duty; the mission is so secret he can’t even tell Inge 
where he’ll be sent, however she agrees to wait for him. As the film reveals, the 
Luftwaffe sends him to fight in the Spanish Civil War as part of the Condor Legion. 
Three years go by in which neither lover has made an effort to contact the other.  
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Figure 2: Budding love torn asunder by war, only to be reunited through music. Source: 
Wunschkonzert, dir. Eduard von Borsody. 
 
Having participated in the initial invasion, Herbert is now stationed in Poland. In the 
interim, Helmut, one of Inge’s childhood friends, has also joined the Luftwaffe and 
unknowingly been assigned under Herbert’s command. Before he leaves, Helmut 
proposes to her. Secretly still waiting for Herbert, she turns him down. He leaves for 
Poland, where he and Herbert become friends. Unaware of Herbert and Inge’s 
relationship, Helmut keeps a photo of her and continues to hold out hope. During the 
same period, the Request Concerts have become very popular both with the troops and on 
the home front. Herbert sends in a request to hear the Olympic Fanfare. Listening at 
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home, Inge is reminded of the time they spent together in 1936 and decides to write him. 
After exchanging letters, they agree to meet in Hamburg. But as Herbert is about to leave 
to meet her, he receives orders to fly a reconnaissance mission. Once again he puts duty 
above his personal feelings and stands her up. Flying with Helmut, they find and 
photograph an enemy fleet, but upon achieving their objective run into heavy anti-aircraft 
fire and crash in the ocean. Helmut is wounded, but the crew flags down a passing U-boat 
and are promptly rescued. Inge visits Helmut in the hospital and encounters Herbert, who 
found Helmut’s picture of Inge in the crashed airplane. Believing they are engaged, he 
tells Inge he won’t get in their way. But when Helmut learns about Herbert and Inge’s 
relationship, he, too, insists on doing the honorable thing and refuses to pursue her 
further. Finally able to be together, they leave the hospital arm-in-arm to the strains of 
another Wunschkonzert, followed by a brief montage of German military might. 
 While the plot of Wunschkonzert is a very straightforward romantic drama, there 
are also a number of subplots that serve to emphasis National Socialist ideology, as well 
as scenes featuring the concerts, including a lengthy musical interlude between the 
penultimate and ultimate scenes. The central element of Wunschkonzert is not the love 
story, but rather the idea of the People’s Community, or Volksgemainschaft. According to 
Nazi ideology, the German people share a mythical bond that transcends all physical 
separation, symbolized in the film by specifically German music. The Request Concerts 
in the film function as physical expressions of the bond, allowing Germans on the front 
lines and on the home front to communicate with their loved ones. While largely 
extraneous to the main love story, the numerous subplots provide further expression of 
this connection between Germans, as symbolized by the music. One such thread concerns 
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two soldiers who contrive to appear on the show after having saved the lives of five pigs 
while serving in France. In another, a soldier’s wife requests her husband’s favorite tune 
and asks the host of the show to inform him of the birth of their first child. It’s no 
accident then that the main couple in the film fell in love during the Olympics, a symbol 
of Germany’s rebirth, in the presence of Adolph Hitler himself, and rediscover each other 
through their shared connection to the German People’s Community.82 
 As a film about the special bond connecting the German people during the war, 
the other major element of Wunschkonzert is, of course, the war. Like most other films 
produced under Nazi Germany directly concerning the ongoing war, the conflict is 
presented as the undertaking of courageous men who risk injury and death to achieve 
their objectives, support their comrades, and above all defeat the enemy. The film does 
not depict any human suffering; death is always instantaneous. The enemy is never seen, 
and while they always carry weapons, German soldiers never actually fire them. Violence 
exists, but only the form of artillery barrages fired from a great distance. Brave Luftwaffe 
pilots drop bombs on unseen enemy positions, while Wehrmacht soldiers sit in dugouts 
and care for their wounded comrades. The effects of war and violence are systematically 
suppressed, a common element shared by nearly all propaganda from the early war 
period. The political aspects of war are entirely absent; it is irrelevant who the enemy are 
or why they must be fought. The concept of a war as a struggle between nations no longer 
applies. Instead, warfare is presented as an ordinary occupation, whose practice is a 
normal, everyday occurrence. To a contemporary viewer, the Germany presented in 
Wunschkonzert is eternally at war with an unnamed someone. The events of the film 
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would have seemed far more concrete to the German public who went to see the film by 
the millions. 
 
Figure 3: Soldiers who have risked everything for a chance to appear on a Musical 
Request Concert. Source: Wunschkonzert, dir. Eduard von Borsody 
 
 As the second most popular film of Nazi Germany, it would seem clear that 
Wunschkonzert achieved a resonance with the German public. As such it may be able to 
offer a picture of the sympathies of the people who went to see it. The film offers an 
undeniably rose-tinted view of Germany. It is still a place where beautiful couples can 
fall in love and plan a future together. It is also one of the mightiest countries on earth; 
assured of victory in any conflict it has entered, or will enter into. It was a Germany that 
made one proud to be a German. The film manages to unite two of the more prominent of 
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Goebbels’ recurring themes, simultaneously yearning for the perfect harmony of the 
Volk’s imaginary past, while striving for the nationalist glory of a Nazi future. The 
combination of a love story, coupled with the simple joys of family and culture, and the 
reunification of absent friends and loved ones separated on the battlefield and home front 
makes for a very charming story if one is able to set aside the emotional and moral 
implications of Nazism in the present. In some respects, Wunschkonzert is an 
amalgamation of every popular genre in Germany in the early 1940s. The portrayal of 
military service is almost a combination of adventure film heroism and state-sponsored 
documentaries about the armed forces; the romantic plot could have been borrowed from 
any contemporary melodrama; the concert scenes would be at home in any musical. The 
only type of film not represented is the “anti” film-- anti-Semitic, anti-British, and anti-
Russian. With the exception of several scenes extolling the camaraderie and sacrifice of 
war, Wunschkonzert is entirely a “pro” film: pro-Germany, pro-heroism pro-love and 
above all pro-rosy future. The film would seem to be best categorized as National 
Socialist escapist entertainment. Its popularity seems to suggest that the German film-
going public was willing to support the Nazi regime on the basis of a shared yearning to 
transform an idealized past into a glittering future. 
For Goebbels it was a great propaganda achievement, and one he was to repeat 
two years later with The Great Love (Die Grosse Liebe, 1942.) 83 Both films were 
markedly similar in terms of plot and treatment of the war. The hero in Die Grosse Liebe 
is also a Luftwaffe pilot, whose romance with a singer is similarly interrupted by a war 
characterized by a complete lack of enemies and a constant string of victories.  
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The popularity of films like Die Grosse Liebe and Wunschkonzert indisputably 
owes a great deal to their melodramatic love stories. But while this genre gave them a 
great deal of traction with the German public, both films also share the strong 
nationalistic tendencies of the popular genre of propaganda films. The male hero in each 
case is a Luftwaffe pilot who falls in love with an Aryan maiden, but is abruptly called 
back to the service of the Fatherland in the midst of planning a future together. In both 
cases the hero leaves to fulfill his duty, fighting in a war depicted as a grand adventure 
devoid of political meaning or human suffering. While love and marriage are also 
encouraged, they must not interfere with most pressing concern of all: the war. However 
the war is not depicted as an epic life or death struggle. It is simply a profession for these 
men; once they have distinguished themselves they are allowed to return home to marry 
their sweethearts. The causes and conditions of the war aren’t even mentioned; it is 
simply a temporary interruption to everyday life. German victory, it seems, will be the 
inevitable result of German resolve. 
Titanic and the Changing War 
If Wunschkonzert and similar films about the promise of renewed prosperity and 
community arising from the war represent Goebbels’ greatest cinematic successes during 
the war, then certainly a film like Titanic (1943)84 would mark one of the lowest points. 
In contrast to Wunschkonzet’s popular success, Goebbels blocked Titanic’s release for 
ideological reasons after a troubled and costly production. The film can be seen as a 
bridge between the films of 1939-42 and 1943-45, as a product of Goebbel’s anti-British 
agitational propaganda that wasn’t ready for release until after it was no longer of use. Its 
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shift in the direction Goebbels set for the film industry, both in terms of the ideological 
content that he believed would be would best suit the needs of the moment, and in terms 
of the importance he placed on public taste. It simultaneously hints at the inferior moral 
degeneracy of the British and upholds the superiority of German values.  
Titanic is naturally the story of the ill-fated passenger liner, retold to vilify the 
British and blame them for the ship’s sinking in 1912.  The film’s portrayal of the British 
characters is heavily informed by stereotypes and their position as Germany’s enemy. 
They are always impeccably dressed, usually in formalwear regardless of the occasion. 
Preoccupied with acquiring wealth on the stock market, the constantly maneuver to 
become richer and more powerful than their fellow countrymen. Compared with other 
Nazi propaganda films, they share a great deal in common with portrayals of Jews, 
always scheming and plotting to gain more wealth and power. The British pursuit of 
profit is presented as a game that has left the players permanently out of touch with 
reality, unable to see the consequences of their actions. Even as the ship sinks beneath 
them, Sir Bruce Ismay, the ship’s owner, callously uses his position to extort money from 
J J Astor, the most wealth man on board, offering him a seat on a life boat if Astor will 
cover Ismay’s debts incurred playing the stock market. 
While the British attempt to turn a profit out of a calamity of their own making, 
only the noble German passengers and crew have the fiber to even try to and persuade 
Captain Smith and Bruce Ismay to slow the ship down, alter course or take some other 
measure to save the ship. Not only do they present the sole voices of reason, whose 
wisdom and foresight could have saved 1500 lives, after the ship’s collision with iceberg 
the Germans remain the only ones board determined to do the right thing and carry out an 
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orderly evacuation prioritizing the women and children. The stark contrast serves to 
emphasize the valorous nature of Germans, compared with the misguided intentions of 
the British. If only the British- in both 1912 and 1943- understood the dangers the 
Germans were trying to confront, they might stop resisting and events would turn out 
better for everyone. In its historical context, the film’s message is a reinforcement of 
belief in the German war effort against England early in the war (primarily 1939-40, 
although the popularity of anti-British propaganda peaked during 1941-42 with films 
such as Ohm Krüger). The British, concerned only with generating ever-greater profits, 
must be defeated so their economic warfare and greed cannot claim further innocent 
German lives. The preoccupation with financial gain at the expense of everything else, as 
attributed to the British by German propaganda, simultaneously makes them an object of 
derision and disgust, as they backstab each other and jockey for ownership of the White 
Star Line and the Titanic. The ship sinks as a direct result of the actions British and their 
pursuit of greater profits, despite the efforts of well-intentioned German passengers and 
crewmembers to prevent the calamity. 
The circumstances of Titanic’s production were anything but ideal. Exterior 
filming took place aboard the liner SS Cap Arcona, a passenger ship taken over by the 
German Navy in 1940.85 Tragically the ship was later sunk by RAF aircraft a day before 
the Nazi surrender in 1945, while carrying concentration camp inmates. An estimated 
5000 were killed, more than three times as many as the Titanic.86 Lifeboat scenes were 
shot in the North Sea, and interiors at Tobis studios in Germany. The first director, 
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Herbert Selpin, was arrested by Goebbels for making disparaging remarks about the 
Kriegsmarine officers (German Navy) advising the production, who it seems were more 
interested in the female cast members than the film. After refusing Goebbel’s demand to 
retract the comments, he was found dead in his cell a day later on August 1, 1942, under 
mysterious circumstances. The official cause of death was ruled a suicide. The remained 
of the film was completed under the direction of Werner Klinger.87 The production was 
overseen personally by Goebbels, and was an expensive film at a time when Goebbels 
was intentionally trying to keep production costs down. 
 
Figure 4: Panicking passengers try to escape the Titanic’s lower decks prompted 
Goebbels to ban the film. Source: Titanic, dir. Werner Klingler and Herbert Selpin. 
 
                                                
87 Cinzia Romani, Tainted Goddesses: Female Film Stars of the Third Reich, 71 
  50 
In terms of propaganda, Titanic was an unmitigated failure. The film passed the 
censorship board, but the Theater, in which the premier was to take place, was bombed 
the night before the opening in early 1943, destroying the master print.88 The film finally 
premiered months later in Paris on November 10, 1943, after which Goebbels swiftly 
banned it.89 The last anti-British propaganda film made during Nazi rule, it was produced 
during the most crucial juncture in the war. Allied bombers from Britain had begun 
systematically bombing German cities to undermine civilian morale. German forces in 
Russia, initially advancing dozens of miles a day, gradually ground to a freezing halt in 
the Russian Winter outside the cities of Moscow and Leningrad. Meanwhile in late 1942, 
the German 6th Army at Stalingrad found itself engaged in a life-or-death struggle for 
control of the city that would ultimately decide the course of the war. Titanic was 
scheduled for release at a time when the Nazi leadership was beginning to realize the war 
had turned against them, and German civilians were increasingly suffering daily bombing 
raids. Goebbels’ Sportpalast Speech on February 18th, 1943, calling for a total war, set a 
new tone for Nazi propaganda, moving away from the celebration of German victories 
and the ideological belittlement of their enemies, demanded large sacrifices of the 
German people in the name of victory. Titanic’s anti-British theme was caught at the 
trailing edge of Goebbels’ previous paradigm. Owing to its lengthy production, it was 
completed at a time when it’s value as propaganda was rapidly diminishing, and thanks to 
its delayed premiere it was deemed as having lost all it’s persuasive currency even before 
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it was exhibited. The film received limited play in the occupied countries, but was never 
released in Germany.90 
Late War Years 
“Until the first setback at Stalingrad there can be little doubt that Germans visited 
the cinema to have their own National Socialist ideas reinforced, and in this respect 
Goebbels was able to give them what they wanted to see and hear.”91 However, as the 
war turned against Germany, faith in the Nazi’s leadership began to waver, and the  myth 
of the German armed forces’ implacability was irrevocably shattered. Goebbels had given 
himself a distinct advantage by intentionally building on his own prior work. Films 
demonizing the Allies, reinforced by terror bombing and additional propaganda had 
taught Germans to hate their adversaries. As Germany’s situation grew increasingly dire, 
Goebbels placed his hopes for victory in building the public to fight to the death. As his 
message changed, so did the emphasis on the types of films released from German 
studios.   
By early 1943 Goebbels had become the de facto public face of the Nazi 
government. The war in the east had become very dire after the defeat at Stalingrad, and 
Goebbels made no secret that defeat was a very real and terrifying possibility for 
Germany. Using this fear to drive economic productivity, he offered the possibility of 
victory at the cost of tremendous sacrifice, provided Germans united to confront the 
threat.92 By way of encouragement, Goebbels concentrated on the production of two 
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types of films: escapist entertainment films, and heavy propaganda epics. The lighter fare 
was intended to offer solace from Germany’s situation. One explanation is Goebbels 
cynically intended to divert people’s attention from the war. However this seems not to 
have been the case. As he wrote in his diary in 1943, “People crave recreation after the 
grueling days and nights of the past week. They seek solace for their souls.”93 His 
ultimate goal was the victory of the German people; offering a temporary diversion, in 
Goebbels mind, allowed the masses to persevere longer. While lighter films aided 
relaxation, ideological films served to direct their efforts. The second type of films 
consisted of some of the most expensive films ever produced in Nazi Germany. These 
propaganda epics encouraged a commitment to total war, based on quasi-historical 
examples where unity in the face of an unstoppable threat had saved the German nation.  
The total number of films produced in Germany declined during the final years of 
the war, especially political films, as production and exhibition became increasingly 
difficult during 1943-1945.94 Supply shortages translated into fewer films produced 
annually, while bombing raids often destroyed theaters. This situation was worse for state 
sponsored propaganda films, which required a great deal of oversight to ensure that the 
political message was conveyed exactly as Goebbels intended it. This often lead to costly 
delays and re-shoots, and consequently these films, already granted exorbitant budgets by 
virtue of the importance placed on them, often went grossly over cost.95 Director Veit 
Harlan recounted how he was granted nearly unlimited access to resources and the 
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freedom to schedule his production as though he were working in peace time.96 Mega 
productions, such as Harlan’s Der grosse König (The Great King, 1942) and Kolberg 
(1945) were still possible because, while the number of feature films produced annually 
declined, film viewership and ticket revenue were at an all-time high in the final years of 
the war, a seeming vindication of Goebbels theories on the rejuvenating powers of the 
cinema. Goebbels chose to concentrate the available resources on a small number of 
productions that satisfied his desire for films of great artistic value and ideological 
influence.  
The Rise and Fall of Newsreels 
The feature film was by no means the sole vehicle for Goebbels’ propaganda efforts, 
especially during the war years. Feature films took a long time to produce. Political 
content required a great deal of oversight in order to calibrate the desired effect. In a 
broad sense, features simply did not provide a cost effective means for delivering 
ideological content. Newspapers and radio broadcasts provided a much more immediate 
means of propagandizing the masses. The Nazi’s single most effective form of mass 
media was the newsreel. The newsreel, which combined the swift reaction time of print 
and broadcast with the gripping emotional qualities of the cinema, was an early 
cornerstone of Nazi propaganda: 
“[In]1927 … Alfred Hugenberg, press baron and leader of 
the National Conservative Party (DNVP), had bought the 
largest and most prestigious German film company, Ufa 
(Universum-Film-Aktiengesellschaft). From now on the 
political and social activities of the NSDAP were captured 
by Ufa newsreels (Ufa-Tonwachen) and shown to the 
German public on the large network of Ufa cinemas.”97 
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But while they had proved useful to the Nazi party from the late ‘20s onward, the 
newsreel truly came into its own as an instrument of propaganda during the early war 
years of 1939-43. Goebbels had assumed control of newsreel production at the same time 
he was solidifying his position as de facto head of the film industry, in whose capacity he 
was able to precisely script every newsreel program that was released. The public was 
always given a very carefully calibrated notion of the ongoing German victories, and the 
war effort in general. Newsreels were typically shown before screenings of nearly every 
feature film (excepting certain documentaries which were in effect feature length 
newsreels,) priming the audience with a propaganda message before the main attraction. 
Following the initial outbreak of war, finding suitable content for the newsreels was a 
relatively straightforward task. During the rapid string of German victories achieved in 
Poland, France, Belgium, Holland, Denmark and the initial invasion of the Soviet Union 
the programs could have written themselves. Propaganda Film Units, established by 
Goebbels in 1938, a year in advance of the outbreak of war, were assigned to follow the 
advancing German armies, provided all the necessary images.98 With overwhelming 
visual evidence, the myth of German invincibility seemed practically a reality. 
This proved to be an effective propaganda strategy. As long as Germany 
continued to be victorious, the newsreel could continue to reinforce National Socialist 
prejudices under the cover of factual reporting.99 The newsreels proved adept at 
portraying to Germans the unstoppable might of the German military, in no small part 
because their much shorter production times allowed them to keep pace with the rapid 
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Blitzkrieg victories.100 Goebbels himself considered it the most effective form of 
propaganda. He lamented during a speech in 1941 that the feature film, for the additional 
production time and higher costs, was at the time a much less useful tool than the 
newsreel.101 
 But for all the success Goebbels enjoyed with newsreels between 1939-1943, they 
became increasingly less effective as the war progressed. One of the biggest challenges 
was the slowing pace of the war. After 1941, the rapid pace of victories began to stall, 
and the war became less about Blitzkrieg assaults and more about holding onto occupied 
territory.102 Another problem arose precisely because of the tight control Goebbels 
maintained over newsreel production. Goebbels felt he had to be careful in his depiction 
of the war, as not to undermine public support with realistic depictions of death and 
destruction. As such, newsreels omitted any mention of military or civilian casualties, 
damaged or lost vehicles, or any property destruction.103 While this sanitized depiction of 
war as an endless string of effortless German victories may have suited Goebbels’ 
propaganda objectives fine, it rapidly lost its initial effectiveness with German audiences. 
Public interest diminished as the war dragged on, as newsreels lost their persuasive power 
due to their unrealistic depictions of victory. While this required Goebbels to re-evaluate 
his strategy somewhat, he was ultimately forced to change his entire approach entirely in 
the wake of the German defeat at the Battle of Stalingrad in early 1943. 
After the defeat at Stalingrad, even Goebbels could not pretend that the ultimate 
German victory was soon at hand.  Whatever faith the German public had in the veracity 
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of what they were being shown in the newsreels was shattered. Goebbels faced something 
of a crisis as growing numbers of people preferred to wait outside until the end of the 
newsreel before taking a seat for the feature presentation. His angry response was to 
order theater owners to lock their doors after the newsreel began, forcing people to sit 
through it in order to watch the feature. Ultimately Goebbels changed his tone entirely, 
marking the shift from early war propaganda into late war propaganda. German victories 
and militarism were no longer given any role. Since victory by conventional means had 
become a fast fading hope, Goebbels chose instead to push for Total War, and to devote 
the efforts of the Propaganda Ministry towards mentally preparing the population to resist 
the inevitable Soviet counter-invasion. 104 
 In his book, David Welsh makes the argument that Goebbels, as the Minister of 
Propaganda, was more concerned with channeling public spirit in support of the war than 
he was in accurately informing the public about the nature of war. Because Goebbels 
proscribed what could and could not be shown in the newsreels, Welsh concludes, “the 
Nazis betrayed how little they were concerned with reality.”105 However, Goebbels was 
considerably less interested in propagating a fantasy than he was with channeling public 
support of the war. As Welsh himself notes, newsreels seldom reported outright lies, 
instead twisting the truth to support National Socialist ideology.  However in molding 
truth to suit the needs of ideology, Goebbels increasingly fell prey to his own 
propagandizing. As he pushed for total war, he himself believed more than ever in the 
ability of German will to resist and defeat the coming invasion, increasingly disconnected 
from a demoralized German public.  
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Kolberg 
Kolberg was the last state-sponsored film, and the most expensive film ever 
produced during the Third Reich. The film’s true cost of 8 million marks was never made 
public in order to avoid outcry.106 It was shot during 1943-44, as Germany began to 
suffer defeats on all fronts, on the personal orders of Goebbels.  Personally overseen by 
Goebbels, Kolberg was supposed to be his cinematic master opus, a film that would 
provide ordinary Germans with the emotional steel necessary to fight a total war. Set in 
1807 and 1813, Kolberg purports to be an historically accurate period film, retelling the 
story of the brave citizens of Kolberg defending their town against the invading forces of 
Napoleon.107 However the film’s lavish period spectacle belie the desperate 
circumstances of its production, and the numerous anachronisms, inaccuracies and even 
outright lies with which Goebbels sought to convince the German people to follow the 
example of the brave, fictional people of Kolberg. 
With Kolberg, Goebbels sought to reinforce the historical legitimacy of total war 
as a strategy for victory. By demonstrating that a previous group of Germans had 
defeated a vastly superior force through sheer determination and a willingness to fight to 
the last breath, Goebbels sough to inspire present Germans to do the same. Somehow he 
believed that by elevating the struggle at Kolberg to mythic proportions he could reveal 
the capacity for self-sacrificing bravery in ordinary Germans upon which the Third 
Reich’s desperate hopes for survival rested in the face of the Allied advance. Whether or 
not Goebbels’ beliefs in this matter were unfounded is largely irrelevant; in the last years 
of the war, nothing else remained. But what is most revealing about Goebbels state of 
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mind with regards to total war is that the “historical” evidence the film presents, 
including the German victory, were largely fictional. Within the film, the past is not a 
series of events that preceded and led to the present. Rather the present is necessarily the 
logical result of the past, in which the latter must be conformed to the constraints of the 
former. In the process of explaining the past in terms of the present, factual accuracy is 
no longer paramount. History is no longer an investigation into past events, but a means 
to manipulate the very definition of truth to suit the needs of a cause. This moment 
perfectly illustrates how Goebbels manipulated history: the situation at the end of the war 
demanded the people be inspired to defend the Reich with everything they had left. If the 
Reich fell, everything was lost. As a result historical accuracy, especially in historical 
drama, was no longer even a consideration. 
 While the citizens’ refusal to surrender Kolberg is factual, their willingness to 
hold fast and die to for a greater Germany seems like an anachronistic injection of late-
19th century pan-Germanic rhetoric, combined with a thoroughly 20th century 
conceptualization of a total war in what is otherwise a lavish period war drama.  
The most glaring of the inaccuracies built in to the film is the final victory at 
Kolberg. The French are depicted withdrawing after suffering unacceptably high 
casualties, when in reality the siege was lifted after Prussia negotiated a surrender with 
France.108 The most bitter irony of the film is that in depicting the struggle a between 
small group of innocent citizens victimized by larger force, the film inadvertently 
glorifies actions of resistance against the Nazis. 
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As a film, Kolberg is not particularly exceptional. The story proper is told as a 
flashback, bookended with a pair of scenes set five years after the battle for Kolberg, in 
which Gneisenau, the former commander of the town’s military forces calls on Prussian 
king Frederick William III to mobilize the people of Prussia to fight against the now-
retreating Napoleon. This awkward chronological arrangement does not serve the story 
well, and only seems necessary in order to forge a connection between the town’s 
resistance and the rise of the German state. The film’s production consumed an inordinate 
amount of national resources, including the use of nearly 200,000 soldiers pulled off the 
eastern front to serve as extras for the massive battle scenes.109 The film was shot on 
location in Pomerania, using the expensive Agfacolor color process. Production took 
place during the summer, so in order to shoot scenes set in the winter, Goebbels ordered 
large amounts of salt be shipped by railroad to the set, providing the film with fake snow 
and utilizing resources that may have better served the war effort. However Goebbels 
seems to have been disinclined to view the situation in simple terms of military 
application: with the war in the east turning against the Nazis, Goebbels was keen to 
mobilize not only the armed forces and war industry, but also the German civilian 
population. In the spirit of the film, they would be called upon to defend their homes in 
the wake of the advancing Soviets. Goebbels believed Kolberg could radicalize the 
German people, inspiring them to rise up in defense of their homeland, and as such he 
believed it would be more valuable than a military victory.  
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Figure 5: Veit Harlan's cinematic contribution to Nazi Germany's defeat. Thousands of 
soldiers march in Kolberg. Source: Kolberg, dir. Veit Harlan. 
 
One of the more noteworthy aspects of Kolberg is its unusual disregard for the 
military. The Prussian army is portrayed as largely inept, with the exception of a few 
capable officers such as Gneisenau, while the civilians, through their willingness to 
sacrifice everything for their town, prove to be the decisive factor in Napoleon’s defeat. 
One explanation is that this film was intended primarily for civilian audiences, in which 
case the film’s message would be that civilians should no longer rely on the military to 
win the war for Germany. But by the time film was ready for release, very few cinemas 
remained open, the Soviets were practically on Germany’s doorstep and German civilians 
were actively pressed into service as a defense force. Under the conditions in which the 
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film was actually released, total war had erased the division between soldier and civilian. 
In this sense, Goebbels propaganda campaign was a success; but it was not enough to 
save Germany. Kolberg was finished too late in the war to spend more than a couple 
weeks in theaters. It was premiered on January 30th, 1945, in Berlin. Very few cinemas in 
Germany were still running. It received very limited distribution, shown almost 
exclusively to Nazi party members. On January 10th a copy was flown and airdropped 
into the La Rochelle U-boat base in France.110  It was screened on January 30th for the 
remaining soldiers and sailors concurrently with the Berlin premiere.111 Vice-Admiral 
Schirlitz, the base commander, wrote Goebbels following the premiere, stating that  
“deeply moved by the artistic presentation of the heroic action of the Kolberg fortress, 
[the men under his command]…pledge to emulate the courageous struggles at home.”112 
He later surrendered to the Allies in May 1945. 
In terms of its original intentions, Kolberg was a failure. Goebbels lavished an 
inordinate amount of resources on a film that ultimately did nothing to affect the course 
of the war. Very few German civilians, the film’s primary audience, ever had the chance 
to see it. The film simply took too long to make. The small number of people who did see 
it were either suitably unaffected by it’s message, or not in positions to alter the course of 
the war. In the final months of the war Goebbels devoted his efforts to crafting messages 
that were both ideologically suited to instilling his total war doctrine and palatable 
enough that a war-traumatized public would be willing go to see them. German cinema 
from the later war years was largely given to topical escapist fantasies combined with 
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veiled propaganda. The films Goebbels commissioned, promising a victory that had only 
to be willed into existence, belied Germany’s grim outlook. However in finding the 
balance between popularity and propaganda in the final days of the war, Goebbels sided 
with his own fantasies of a triumph through will. Ultimately, Kolberg is a testament to 
Goebbels’ belief that an ideological victory could trump a military, which came too late 
to have any effect. 
Conclusion 
Goebbels declared in 1933 “the German cinema has the mission of conquering the 
world as the vanguard of the Nazi Troops.”113 Over the next 12 years he learned to 
conquer the minds of Germans and built support for Nazi Germany’s war effort. In order 
to do so, Goebbels worked within the public’s existing prejudices, both in terms of taste 
and ideological susceptibility. His ability to manipulate prejudice to serve, while 
imperfect, is nevertheless impressive and terrifying for his audacity and relative degree of 
success. 
While Goebbels propaganda themes changed drastically between 1933 and 1945, 
they always conveyed the message he deemed necessary to suit the needs of the moment, 
in a manner he calculated would have the greatest effect. When Nazis assumed power, he 
established almost from the onset his preference for subtle approach propaganda, which 
left the viewer largely unaware they were being inculcated in an ideology. Films like 
Hitlerjunge Quex and the other films in the Martyr Trilogy are examples of the type of 
overt propaganda Goebbels opposed, and the manner in which the film industry sought to 
curry favor with the new leaders of Germany. While his rivals pushed for these overt 
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celebrations of Nazism, Goebbels’ successful efforts at excluding them from influence 
over the film industry, which willingly embraced his policies, thereby ensured the 
primacy of his vision. 
 In order to more effectively pursue the indoctrination of Nazi ideology, Goebbels 
assumed greater and greater and degrees of direct control over the German film industry, 
beginning in 1934 with the passage of the Reich Cinema law. This led its subsequent 
reorganization, and ultimately its nationalization as a branch of the Ministry for Popular 
Enlightenment and Propaganda. As part of his broader propaganda strategy, Goebbels 
used the cinema to vindicate earlier Nazi decisions and policies, making emotional 
arguments that appealed to the German sense of community and nationalism. Part of 
Goebbel’s struggle in the years preceding the war was to maintain the industry’s 
profitability, which was struggling from a combination of falling box office revenues and 
rising production costs. While nationalization led to a partial decrease in production 
costs, at least on non-political productions, the war brought about an increase in cinema 
attendance. Propaganda films portraying the might of the German military and the 
deceitful, wicked nature of Germany’s enemies became increasingly popular. Jud Süss 
depicted Jews, the Nazi’s ultimate racial enemy, as treacherous, slippery demonic 
characters whose only aims were to destroy Germany, seduce virtuous Aryan women and 
make a profit in the process. Others, like Ohm Krüger or Titanic portrayed the British as 
a tyrannical, immoral people who throughout history had inflicted grievous suffering and 
abuse on innocent Germans.  
 The German public’s taste in film remained largely unchanged despite the 
increase in agitational propaganda. Dramatic films remained the most popular type in the 
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years following the outbreak of war, as they had in the preceding years. While newsreels 
became the primary source of disseminating propaganda during the early part of the war, 
films about normal life in wartime achieved the greatest successes of the entire Nazi 
period. Wunschkonzert established a precedent that achieved great resonance with 
German audiences. It offered the possibility of a normal, prosperous life in wartime and 
the imminent promise of victory over Germany’s enemies. However, most wartime 
propaganda was directly tied to military victories, which became increasingly rare after 
1943.114 As Germany’s situation grew increasingly dire as the Allies pressed the nation 
from both sides, the tone of German films changed. Instead of historical dramas about the 
suffering of past generations of Germans at the hands of Germany’s present, he 
increasingly called for films drawing comparisons between the present situation and past 
struggles. In film, newsreels, speeches and print, Goebbels laid Germany’s desperation 
clear in no uncertain terms: the nation faced annihilation at the hands of its enemies 
unless it could unite, as it had in times past, to confront the threat. Through great personal 
sacrifice and sheer determination, Germany could prevail and defeat its enemies in a total 
war. This message was repeated in films like Kolberg, which presented a (false) historical 
equivalent to Germany’s present situation, when a group of Germans had defeated a 
vastly superior force through endurance of personal hardship and sheer willpower. 
 However, Goebbels efforts were either too little or too late. Ultimately, his total 
war campaign amounted only to greater destruction and death on Germany’s march to 
defeat. It may indeed have persuaded Germans to fight harder, but had little effect on the 
outcome. Goebbels took his own life on May 1, 1945 as the Red Army pushed into 
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Berlin, leaving as his legacy the unprecedented manipulation of a modern nation through 
mass media. The feature films he oversaw in Germany are a testament to the power of 
motion pictures to convey ideas and the ease with which the medium can be used to 
persuade and inspire, even destructively so. While the absence of the original emotional 
context serves to diminish the sway of even the most persuasive of Nazi Germany’s 
ideological films, they nevertheless serve as reminders about the persuasive nature of 
visual evidence. However, it is also necessary to remember that so long as a person has 
the choice of whether or not view a film, they have the ultimate responsibility for the 
lasting impression it leaves on them. Goebbels learned to successfully anticipate the 
yearnings of the German public, and responded accordingly with messages tailored to 
influence them according to his designs. In choosing to see Wunschkonzert or Jud Süss, 
and have their sentiments altered in accordance with the film’s ideology, it can be said 
that Germans offered tacit support for the regime’s policies. Using more data of this sort, 
it is possible to further understand how Germans as a collective reacted to Goebbels 
propaganda campaigns, and the events that shaped Nazi Germany. But the extent to 
which every man, woman and child believed in National Socialist ideology is a matter 
personal to each, and a task which historians are ill equipped to pursue, regardless of the 
tools available. 
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